NEC-98: Say precisely what the hosted service holds that the passphrase bears on #197

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nectenda-agent merged 4 commits from worktree-nec-98-say-precisely-what-the-hosted-service-hol into main 2026-09-28 14:39:44 +01:00

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nectenda-agent commented 2026-09-27 15:49:43 +01:00

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Task: NEC-98 — https://projectron.nerchure.com/tasks/98

Several copies of the security claim said the hosted service receives "nothing derived from the passphrase". That is false: it stores the private key wrapped under a passphrase-derived key. This narrows the privacy notice, terms, key-storage.md, the purchase email, the plugin's published comments and both READMEs to what is true, that no hash or verifier is sent, and pins the wording in security-model-claims.test.ts. Review found that security-model.md and CRYPTO-025 still overclaimed. They called the wrapped key the only passphrase-bound value held, but user_key_history keeps every earlier wrapping, and they said the master key is never stored, but the recovery blob is that key sealed. Both are now disclosed and pinned (NEC-140). Documentation and comments only; no code path changes.

Spec: docs/changes/NEC-98-passphrase-derived-claims/spec.md

Also fixes NEC-140: Security model says the wrapped private key is the only passphrase-bound value held
Also fixes NEC-141: README says keys are derived from the password and never reach the server

Changelog

The privacy notice, terms, security model and purchase email now say exactly what the hosted service holds that your passphrase bears on: never a hash or verifier of it, but your private key wrapped under it, including earlier wrappings kept after a passphrase change.

Task: NEC-98 — https://projectron.nerchure.com/tasks/98 Several copies of the security claim said the hosted service receives "nothing derived from the passphrase". That is false: it stores the private key wrapped under a passphrase-derived key. This narrows the privacy notice, terms, key-storage.md, the purchase email, the plugin's published comments and both READMEs to what is true, that no hash or verifier is sent, and pins the wording in security-model-claims.test.ts. Review found that security-model.md and CRYPTO-025 still overclaimed. They called the wrapped key the only passphrase-bound value held, but user_key_history keeps every earlier wrapping, and they said the master key is never stored, but the recovery blob is that key sealed. Both are now disclosed and pinned (NEC-140). Documentation and comments only; no code path changes. Spec: `docs/changes/NEC-98-passphrase-derived-claims/spec.md` Also fixes NEC-140: Security model says the wrapped private key is the only passphrase-bound value held Also fixes NEC-141: README says keys are derived from the password and never reach the server ## Changelog The privacy notice, terms, security model and purchase email now say exactly what the hosted service holds that your passphrase bears on: never a hash or verifier of it, but your private key wrapped under it, including earlier wrappings kept after a passphrase change.

nectenda-agent added 4 commits 2026-09-27 15:49:43 +01:00

Say no hash or verifier of the passphrase is sent, not nothing derived ... 3f37bdc6d5

The hosted service holds the private key wrapped under a passphrase-derived
key, so "nothing derived from the passphrase reaches us" was false. NEC-52
narrowed security-model.md, identity.md and CRYPTO-025; this narrows the
privacy notice, the terms, key-storage.md, the purchase email, the plugin's
published comments and the mirror README to the same claim, and pins it in
security-model-claims.test.ts so the broad form cannot come back.

Task: NEC-98
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016TPRS2zZaf7AQkXcFNfmJW

Drop "the one passphrase-bound value" and "keys are derived" overclaims ... f8f8f389af

Review found both untrue: the identity service also keeps earlier wrappings
of the private key and the recovery blob, and the identity keypair and
folder keys are random rather than passphrase-derived. The plugin comment
also named the master key as the wrapping key where it is its HKDF output.

Task: NEC-98
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016TPRS2zZaf7AQkXcFNfmJW

Disclose kept earlier wrappings and the sealed master key ... fa3f38914a

security-model.md and CRYPTO-025 said the wrapped private key was the only
passphrase-bound value the hosted service holds, but user_key_history keeps
every superseded wrapping, so an old passphrase stays guessable after a
change. "The master key is never stored" likewise ignored the recovery blob,
which is that key sealed under the recovery key. Both are pinned.

Task: NEC-98
Also-fixes: NEC-140
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016TPRS2zZaf7AQkXcFNfmJW

Stop the README saying keys are password-derived and never reach the server ... 1c321dbc40

Folder-key wraps reach the sync server and the wrapped private key reaches
the identity service, and neither key is derived from the password. Same
wording as the mirror README now uses.

Task: NEC-98
Also-fixes: NEC-141
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016TPRS2zZaf7AQkXcFNfmJW

cruelacid force-pushed worktree-nec-98-say-precisely-what-the-hosted-service-hol from 1c321dbc40 to 8fecd219da 2026-09-28 14:33:43 +01:00 Compare

nectenda-agent merged commit 8fecd219da into main 2026-09-28 14:39:44 +01:00

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