Change attribution #63

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opened 2026-09-21 18:06:05 +01:00 by cruelacid · 1 comment

cruelacid commented

2026-09-21 18:06:05 +01:00

Owner

Part of #37.

What Relay does

Not shipped. "Change attribution — click a collaborator in the avatar stack
to highlight their text inline" is Active on their roadmap.

What it would take

Yjs already carries a client id per character inside the document, and the
document is what we encrypt — so attribution is decryptable client-side and
needs no server change. What is missing is a stable client-id-to-user mapping
that survives reconnects.

Why it is unscheduled rather than sequenced

It pairs naturally with the version browser, and it is worth less than it looks:
the per-span author data bloats every document, and on a note edited by several
people over months the colouring becomes noise. Worth doing when someone asks for
it, and worth measuring the document-size cost before committing.

Risk

risk:none.

Part of #37. ## What Relay does **Not shipped.** "Change attribution — click a collaborator in the avatar stack to highlight their text inline" is Active on their roadmap. ## What it would take Yjs already carries a client id per character inside the document, and the document is what we encrypt — so attribution is **decryptable client-side** and needs no server change. What is missing is a stable client-id-to-user mapping that survives reconnects. ## Why it is unscheduled rather than sequenced It pairs naturally with the version browser, and it is worth less than it looks: the per-span author data bloats every document, and on a note edited by several people over months the colouring becomes noise. Worth doing when someone asks for it, and worth measuring the document-size cost before committing. ## Risk `risk:none`.

cruelacid added this to the Backlog - unscheduled milestone

2026-09-21 18:06:05 +01:00

cruelacid added the

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2026-09-21 18:06:05 +01:00

cruelacid referenced this issue

2026-09-21 18:08:51 +01:00

Relay feature parity, with end-to-end encryption (tracking) #37